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SCHOOL AID:
CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES AFTER AGUILAR
v. FELTON
PATRICIA A. DEAN, ESQUIRE*
Immediately after the United States Supreme Court's decision on
July 1, 1985, in Aguilar v. Felton,' state and local education authorities
faced the practical obstacles engendered by that decision. School districts
across the nation attempted to formulate and implement plans for pro-
viding educational services for the 1985-86 school year, under both fed-
eral and state educational programs, at locations other than parochial
school buildings. Several state or local education officials filed lawsuits
seeking judicial guidance or clarification of their obligations under federal
law, and in accord the Felton decision, to provide educational services to
parochial school students at so-called "neutral sites" during the upcoming
school year.
Some state education departments or school districts sought judicial
approval of a delay in implementing federally-funded educational services
at "neutral sites" because of practical problems in locating sites and ar-
ranging transportation for the students.2 Those education authorities
sought court orders that would permit them to continue to provide ser-
vices to parochial school classrooms until they could implement alterna-
tive arrangements. With only one exception, the courts granted the re-
quests for a delay in implementing the "neutral site" requirement in
order to allow school authorities a reasonable amount of time to imple-
ment new plans without depriving students of the benefits of the educa-
* Hughes Hubbard & Reed.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
2 See, e.g., Anderson v. Bennett, No. 85 Civ. 8632 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1985) (tempo-
rary restraining order granted); Felton v. Bennett, No. 78 CV 1750 (ERN) (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 1985) (judgment stayed); Cooperman v. Bennett, No. 85-4926 (AET) (D.N.J. Oct. 25,
1985) (granting temporary relief); Pennsylvania v. Department of Educ., No. CV-95-1762
(D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1986) (granting relief for 1985-86 school year).
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tional programs.'
In Aguilar v. Felton, on remand to the district court, Judge Neaher
entered judgment in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, but
stayed the effect of the judgment for one year-until the start of the
1986-87 school year-conditioned upon the filing of periodic reports on
the progress in developing a plan for the 1986-87 school year." On March
26, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit up-
held Judge Neaher's decision to allow a one-year implementation delay.5
The Court of Appeals made clear, however, that it premised its affirma-
tion of the delay on the understanding, that by the beginning of the 1986-
87 school year, no educational services would be provided in parochial
school classrooms in New York.'
It now seems quite clear that in any school district that is unable,
because of practical problems, to implement "neutral site" services for
the 1986-87 school year, parochial school students will be deprived of
educational services. There is, of course, the possibility that if a particular
school district encounters unusual problems or new obstacles to imple-
menting "neutral site" services, a court might grant a further delay rather
than penalize the children by permitting services to be terminated.
Many school districts implemented "neutral site" plans during the
1985-86 school year. The implementation of the Supreme Court's Felton
decision raised additional consitutional issues. There is no need to hy-
pothesize about what new claims might be the next to be litigated. In
early September 1985, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State filed suit against the Secretary of Education and the United States
Department of Education in the District of Columbia.7 At the same time,
a group of taxpayers, ministers, and others filed suit in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, also against the Secretary and the Department.' Both cases chal-
lenge the administration of Chapter 1 remedial education programs and
both cases raise similar issues.'
' See supra note 2. The sole exception to a request for a court approved delay in imple-
menting the "neutral site" requirement occurred in Wamble v. Bennett, No. 77-0254-CV-W-
8 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 1985) (denying stay and ordering immediate implementation).
' Felton v. Bennett, No. 78 CV 1750 (ERN) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1985).
Felton v. Bennett, 787 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
6 Id.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Bennett, C.A. No. 85-2806
(D.D.C.) (filed Sept. 3, 1985).
' Pulido v. Bennett, No. 85-1096-CV-W-8 (W.D. Mo.) (filed Sept. 3, 1985). The plaintiffs
include a grandmother who purports to represent the interests of her grandchildren, who
attend public schools in Kansas City.
' Chapter I is part of the Education and Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20
U.S.C. §§ 3801 et seq. Chapter I provides federal funds to state and local education agencies
for supplementary remedial education and other education programs.
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To understand the Missouri case, Pulido v. Bennett, a little back-
ground is necessary. Beginning in 1976 and running roughly through
1981, the Department of Education determined that certain Missouri
school districts were unable to provide Chapter 1 educational services to
the parochial school students that were comparable to the services that
public school students received."0 Missouri school districts provided
Chapter 1 services to the public school students during the regular day at
the students' regular public school. The school districts believed, how-
ever, that under Missouri law they could not provide services to parochial
students in their regular schools or during the regular school day. Mis-
souri school districts, therefore, provided services to parochial school stu-
dents only after hours and only at public schools, and they did not pro-
vide to the children any transportation either to or from the public school
where the remedial classes were held." Under that plan, the parochial
school student participation rate had fallen almost to zero. The Depart-
ment of Education determined that this so limited the opportunity for
parochial school students to participate that, if the program was going to
be at all effective, some alternative had to be found." The government
invoked the "bypass" provision in Chapter 1. Under the "bypass," the
government hired an independent contractor in Missouri who provides
the services directly to the parochial school students in the "bypassed"
school districts.
In an earlier case in Missouri, Wamble v. Bell,' 3 plaintiffs, who were
taxpayers and parents of students in public schools, challenged the valid-
ity of the bypass decision and also challenged the constitutionality of pro-
viding services in parochial school classrooms. The District Court in Mis-
souri, in 1984, upheld the validity of the bypass but struck down as
unconstitutional the provision of Chapter 1 services in parochial school
classrooms."
That decision was stayed until the Supreme Court decided the Agui-
Chapter 1 requires that public school districts provide "equitable" educational services to
children attending private schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 3806 (1982).
" The manner in which Missouri school districts provide Chapter 1 services to parochial
school students evolved over the years. At one time, the district provided services at paro-
chial schools, but only after regular school hours. The districts formerly provided some
transportation for parochial school students. The plan described in the text represents the
administrative plan that non-bypassed Missouri school districts have followed for at least
five years and the plan that the districts would implement today.
" Following an investigation, if the Secretary of Education finds that a school district is
unwilling or unable to provide equitable services to private school students, the Secretary
must arrange for those services. See 20 U.S.C. § 3806(b). In the two states that presently
have "bypassed" school districts (Missouri and Virginia), an independent contractor pro-
vides the services to parochial school students.
" 598 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
14 Id.
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lar v. Felton case. After the Supreme Court's decision, the court in the
Wamble case ordered immediate implementation of "neutral site" ser-
vices. 5 By October 1985, parochial school students in the majority of by-
passed school districts were receiving services. The contractor had located
"neutral sites," including public libraries, rented apartments, community
centers, and houses. In some districts-particularly in the rural districts
where there simply was no other place to have the services-the contrac-
tor leased mobile units, which were sent to the parochial schools and were
parked near the schools in order to provide services to parochial school
students safely and efficiently. Most of the mobile units that were used in
Missouri were shared between two or more different locations within a
school district, and, if possible, between districts so that the contractor
could get the most efficient use possible from the mobile unit.
One of the primary challenges in the Missouri Pulido case, which is
also raised in the District of Columbia case, is the "neutrality" of the
mobile unit sites. In most districts these mobile units are parked on the
public street relatively close to the school. When it is time for the Chap-
ter 1 classes, the children leave their normal classes, put on their coats
and hats, go outside, and go into the mobile unit. The children receive
instruction from independent, publicly-paid teachers for about an hour,
three times a week. At the conclusion of Chapter 1 class, the children
return to the school for their regular classes.
The Pulido plaintiffs have alleged that the closer the mobile unit is
to the parochial school, the more unconstitutional it becomes to use mo-
bile units. Under the plaintiffs' theory, if you parked a mile away, it
would be constitutional. A half a mile also would be good. Two blocks
might be okay. If the unit is within a block of the school it might be too
close-presumably too close to the religious atmosphere surrounding the
school. And if the unit is parked right on the street in front of the school
so it will be convenient to the children, apparently the mobile unit be-
comes so pervasively religious that it is unconstitutional for the unit to be
parked there.
Providing Chapter 1 services for parochial school students in some of
the school districts in Missouri presents a slightly different problem. In
certain localities, there is no public parking permitted on any of the
streets near the schools. The only place that a mobile unit can be located
that would be safe for the students is on the parking lot of the school
itself. As you can imagine, under plaintiffs' theory, if parking a mobile
unit a block away or on the street outside the door of the school would
imbue the mobile unit with a religious atmosphere, then certainly being
on the same parking lot as the school is bound to do that.
" See supra note 3.
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The main legal battle in this area, I think, is going to be over the
meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Wolman v. Walter. 6 In Wol-
man, the court held that remedial education classes at "a neutral site off
the premises" of the parochial school are constitutional.'17 The Wolman
case did not hold that services in a mobile unit parked on the school
parking lot would be impermissible. The question is, what makes a site
neutral? The Wolman case suggests that the site can be "neither physi-
cally nor educationally identified with the functions of the nonpublic
school." 8 The Court expressly stated, however, that "so long as these
types of services are offered at truly religiously neutral locations," consti-
tutional problems do not arise. 9
In the Missouri Pulido case, we have taken a hard look at the charac-
teristics of parochial schools themselves that led the Supreme Court to
hold that publicly-funded educational services could not be held in the
parochial school classrooms. It bears repeating that that is all that the
Supreme Court held in either the Aguilar v. Felton case or in the Grand
Rapids case."0 The Court did not address the constitutionality of provid-
ing educational services in a mobile unit on a parking lot or outside the
building or at any other location. The neutrality question that has been
raised in Pulido and in the District of Columbia action simply has not
been decided by the Supreme Court.
The cases that have struck down remedial classes in parochial schools
have focused primarily on the following factors: that regular private
school teachers used the same buildings, classrooms, and hallways; that
the publicly-funded classes were held in the same classrooms as the stu-
dents' regular classes; and that there was a religious atmosphere within
the school itself. Those are, therefore, the factors that might indicate a
"physical or educational" identification between the publicly-funded clas-
ses and the religiously-affiliated school.
It is clear that in a mobile unit-whether the mobile unit is parked a
block away, right outside the school door, or on the parking lot-there is
no physical or educational identification with the parochial school. In ad-
dition, there are no religious symbols or indicia of religion in the mobile
units that would create a "religiously pervasive atmosphere."
In the Grand Rapids case, the Supreme Court found that providing
publicly-funded educational services in parochial school buildings created
a danger that the students would identify the publicly-funded classes
with the parochial school. Certainly students today are going to be aware
" Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
17 433 U.S. at 248.
" 433 U.S. at 246-47.
" Id. at 247.
"0 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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that they must leave their regular school building to attend publicly-
funded classes. They must leave their regular classes. They must, during
the winter, put on their coats and walk to nearby locations or to mobile
units or be transported by bus to their publicly-funded classes. These stu-
dents are certainly going to know that there is something very, very dif-
ferent about the Chapter 1 classes. Therefore, the problems that the Su-
preme Court believed existed in Felton and Grand Rapids simply do not
exist today.
The second major issue that has been raised in both the Pulido case
and the District of Columbia action is how the additional costs that
school districts must incur as a result of the Felton decision will be allo-
cated. The additional costs include expenditures for mobile units, leases
for other classroom space, and any expenses that may be necessary to
transport students to and from their classes. The Department of Educa-
tion issued guidelines in August 1985 that provide that these additional
costs should be deducted from the school district or state's total alloca-
tion prior to any division of funds between public and private school stu-
dents." This has come to be known as the Off-The-Top Allocation
Formula.
The plaintiffs in the Pulido case and in the District of Columbia ac-
tion raise two claims concerning the allocation formula but both claims
are based on the same argument. Plaintiffs argue that these additional
costs should be allocated solely to the parochial school students-that
none of the expenses should be paid from funds that would otherwise be
available for public school students. Plaintiffs' argument is that the paro-
chial school students are the only ones who are benefited by the addi-
tional expenditures and, therefore, that under the Off-the-Top Allocation
Formula more money is being spent on private school students than on
the public school students. Thus, the plaintiffs claim first that the alloca-
tion formula violates Chapter 1 itself and, second, that the allocation
formula favors private school students over public school students and,
therefore, is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Under the formula, all funds that are to be expended for actual in-
struction or instructional materials would be divided equitably between
the public and the parochial school students. This formula fulfills the pri-
mary aim of Chapter 1-to provide equitable and comparable direct edu-
cational benefits to the students. Chapter 1 requires that "expenditures"
for public and private school students "shall be equal."22 The formula
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of Chapter 1 in light of the new
2 "Guidelines on Aguilar v. Felton and Chapter 1 of The Educational Consolidation And
Improvement Act" (ECIA - Questions And Answers) U.S. Department of Education (Au-
gust 1985).
2 See 20 U.S.C. § 3806(a) (1982).
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administrative constraints imposed by Aguilar v. Felton.
There also is no basis for a claim that the allocation formula uncon-
stitutionally favors parochial school students. The availability of Chapter
1 funds to public school districts is expressly conditioned upon their guar-
antee that private school students will receive comparable, equitable edu-
cational services. The additional expenditures for space and transporta-
tion for private school students accrue to the benefit of all students in the
program. Only by expending funds for administrative services that will
ensure that parochial school students will receive comparable and equita-
ble instructional services can public school districts continue to receive
federal funds for instructional services to public school students. Thus,
the allocation of expenses made necessary by the Felton decision to both
public and private school students is equitable because all students ulti-
mately are benefited as a result to those expenditures.
Even if the allocation formula is viewed as disproportionately bene-
fitting parochial school students, the Supreme Court has held that the
proportionality of the benefit is not the keynote of the constitutional
question. In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota
statute that provided a state tax deduction for tuition payments.23 It was
clear in that case that the vast majority of the people who would benefit
from the tax deduction would be parents who sent their children to paro-
chial schools. The Court held that the alleged disproportionate benefit
did not render the statute unconstitutional because the benefit applied
across the board to tuition paid for both public and private school tuition.
Moreover, the Court concluded that any equal effect the tax deduction
might have could be viewed as a return for the benefits that accrue to the
state because parents send their children to private, rather than public,
schools. The reasoning of the Court in Mueller can be applied directly to
the cost allocation issues that are raised in Pulido and in the District of
Columbia action.
A third claim that is common to both the District of Columbia and
the Missouri actions is the claim that parochial school administrators ex-
ercise a "veto power" over how the Chapter 1 services will be provided to
parochial school students. Plaintiffs allege that parochial school adminis-
trators demand and receive "Cadillac" treatment for parochial school stu-
dents and, presumably, that the public school students get economy-class
treatment.
The argument is derived from the requirement in the Chapter 1 reg-
ulations that there must be consultation between the private school ad-
ministrators and the public school districts. Plaintiffs apparently assume
that during the consultation process parochial school administrators "dic-
, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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tate" the manner in which Chapter 1 services must be provided to paro-
chial school students. Chapter 1, however, vests final decision-making au-
thority in the school districts and the Supreme Court already has held, in
Wheeler v. Barrera, that Chapter 1 does not give parochial school admin-
istrators a "veto power."2 ' The Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar v.
Felton did not cause any change in the Chapter 1 consultation require-
ment that would mandate a change in that result.
The fourth issue that is common to both the District of Columbia
and the Missouri actions is whether the expenditure of public funds for
classroom locations that are used to provide educational services exclu-
sively to parochial school students violates the Constitution. The battle-
ground on that issue is also, I believe, going to be over the interpretation
of Wolman v. Walter. There, the Supreme Court held that if occasionally
there is a location used exclusively for parochial school students, it would
not offend the Constitution because the Constitution does not require im-
practical results.2 5 We hope that the principle will be extended in light of
the practical consequences of the Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton.
The Chapter 1 program is not the only federal program in litigation
today. In December 1985, a lawsuit was filed in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana-Helms v. Clausen-that has challenged the implementation of the
federal Chapter 2 block grant program.26 Under Chapter 2, school dis-
tricts can use the federal funds for a variety of educational programs. The
Louisiana Helms case raises constitutional challenges to the use of federal
funds to provide educational supplies and equipment for the use of paro-
chial school children on the premises of the parochial schools. Plaintiffs'
claim is that use of such equipment and materials on parochial school
premises "advances religion" and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mueller v. Allen, upholding tuition
tax deductions, and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, will be helpful in de-
fending the programs funded under Chapter 2.27 The Chapter 2 programs
are neutral. They are administered for the benefit of both public and pa-
rochial school students. It is the independent choice of the students' par-
ents to send their children to parochial schools that dictates whether the
educational benefits derived from Chapter 2 programs will be received by
the students in a privately-owned or a publicly-owned building. The First
24 417 U.S. 402 (1973).
" Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247 n.14.
" Helms v. Clausen, No. 85-5533 (E.D. La.) (filed December 2, 1985). The complaint in
Helms also challenges six Louisiana education programs that benefit parochial school stu-
dents or their parents.
7 Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986)
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Amendment should not prohibit the delivery of neutral, secular educa-
tional benefits to any child.
